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Solutions Series Roundtable: North Korea

On Thursday, June 22nd Partnership for a Secure America held an off-the-record roundtable dinner for alumni of the Congressional Partnership Program to discuss the growing North Korea crisis. The discussion focused on the current state of legislative activity seeking to address the crisis, and potential opportunities for collaboration on new approaches.


Issue Background

 

2017 has seen the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) test 24 individual ballistic missiles, including short range, medium range, and submarine launched varieties. This is a continuation of the pattern of aggressive missile testing commenced by Kim Jong-un in 2012. DPRK has conducted 6 nuclear test detonations since 2006; the most recent test (held in September 2017) demonstrated a yield of over 140 kilotons, and is generally agreed to confirm DPRK’s development of thermonuclear capabilities. Current projections indicate that US military assets in Guam, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are within striking distance of DPRK’s missiles, as well as Tokyo and Seoul – which together contain some 23 million citizens. In the months following this event, North Korea has performed several successful missile tests which place American cities from Los Angeles to Chicago within reach of their nuclear weapons.

 

Strengthening the IAEA

On March 22nd, Partnership for a Secure America hosted an experts briefing on how the IAEA can enhance its activities in Nuclear Security and Technical Cooperation. Speakers included David Waller, Former Deputy Director General, IAEA and James Casterton, Former Director, International Safeguards Division, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. This off-the-record briefing focused on the findings of a recent report coordinated by PSA and conducted by former ambassadors to and senior officials of the IAEA reflecting their analysis and diverse views of the world’s deadliest materials, future scenarios, and policy recommendations.

Strengthening the IAEA: Technical Cooperation and Nuclear Security

The Partnership for a Secure America assembled a broadly based International Working Group to examine in depth the IAEA’s current funding structure and sources, and explore ways that non-state donors can better assist the IAEA in developing additional contributions for its nuclear security and technical cooperation programmes.

The Group was composed of individuals from seventeen countries representing all geographic regions of the world and each functional grouping of the IAEA. It included former senior officials from the IAEA Secretariat, former Governors or Ambassadors who represented their countries at the IAEA, and other experts with IAEA experience.

The International Working Group agreed on ten recommendations which it believes would help put the IAEA in a better place to attract, receive and utilize non-traditional contributions to its technical cooperation and nuclear security programmes. They suggested that the Agency should:

  1. Develop a Comprehensive Non-State Funding Strategy
  2. Strong Commitment of the Director General and Senior Management
  3. Improve Communications and Outreach Strategy: Build a Brand
  4. Engage with Non-State Donors: Create Public-Private Partnerships
  5. Address Transparency Concerns: Establish Metrics
  6. Modernize the Agency’s Engagement with the Private Sector
  7. Work More Closely with Other IGOs
  8. Identify Priorities Shared with Donors and Recipient Countries
  9. Solicit Support from Civil Society and NGOs
  10. Follow the Example of the PACT

PSA Convenes Expert Working Group, Suggests Changes to Improve IAEA Partnering Capacity

For Immediate Release: July 19, 2016

Washington, D.C.— An international Working Group convened by Partnership for a Secure America (PSA) released its final report examining ways in which non-state sources can help fund the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) nuclear security and  technical cooperation activities.

The report, Strengthening the IAEA: Technical Cooperation and Nuclear Security, includes ten recommendations on how the IAEA can partner more effectively with the private sector, the nonprofit and donor communities, and with other international governmental organizations. The report notes that IAEA’s budgets, comprised almost exclusively of contributions from its Member States, have not kept pace with new mandates and growing demands for its services, including those in nuclear security and technical assistance.

The Working Group believes that the IAEA should develop “a comprehensive strategy to diversify its revenue stream beyond reliance on state-based contributions.” The report’s completion and publication is an important milestone in a two-year project funded by Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY).

The Working Group was composed of individuals from seventeen countries, including former senior officials from the IAEA Secretariat, former Governors or Ambassadors who represented their countries at the IAEA, and other experts with IAEA experience.

“These experts have been working tirelessly for the past several months to complete this project,” said Dr. Andrew Semmel, Project Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors of PSA, “and we are happy to have completed such a challenging and worthy task.”

The report’s findings represent the views solely of the international Working Group and have not been endorsed by CCNY and do not represent a CCNY position.

 

 

CONTACT: Andrew Szparaga (202-293-8580), or szparaga@psaonline.org.

Loose Nukes and Dirty Bombs- Next Steps for Nuclear Security

Featuring:

Joan Rohlfing, President, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)

Dan Lipman, Co-Chair of the Nuclear Industry Summit and Vice President, Supplier and International Programs, Nuclear Energy Institute

Kelsey Davenport, Director of Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association

Moderated By:

Ambassador Thomas Pickering, Chair, Former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and former Ambassador to the Russian Federation, India, Israel, El Salvador, Nigeria, Jordan, and the United Nations


Three experts drew attention to the upcoming fourth and final Nuclear Security Summit to be held in Washington on March 31-April 1, 2016 and what Congress can do to strengthen this effort. More than 50 heads of state will consider the actions taken by countries (e.g. closed facilities, opened centers of excellence), and decide on how to continue to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism in the wake of the summits. Almost 2,000 metric tons of nuclear materials that could be used in nuclear weapons—highly enriched uranium and plutonium—are spread across hundreds of sites in 25 countries around the world.  A significant quantity of nuclear material is not well secured and vulnerable to theft, and recent incidents at nuclear facilities demonstrate that governments must do more to secure these materials and keep them out of the hands of terrorists.

All panelists anticipate that this nuclear security summit will be the last and that participating states will need to devise means to continue the nuclear security review, monitoring, and reporting function provided through the Summit process. Noting that Congress decreased the nuclear nonproliferation budget since last year, and that 8,500 sites need enhanced security, speakers suggested using the oversight role of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to examine nuclear forensics, radiologic sources, and best practices, as well as increasing the efforts to protect against cyber security, among others.

 

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CPP Dinner with Olli Heinonen, former IAEA Deputy Director General

With continuing concerns over nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea, the U.S. and international partners remain uncertain how to address threats – perceived and real – from these unpredictable nations. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) serves a critical role in this space, providing intelligence on these programs and expert assessments of technical capabilities.

On September 9th, PSA held a special off-the-record CPP dinner with Dr. Olli Heinonen, former Deputy Director General of the IAEA and current Senior Fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, to discuss these country’s nuclear programs, IAEA oversight, current technical assessments, and options for the international community. As the former head of the IAEA Department of Safeguards, Heinonen led teams of international investigators to examine nuclear programs of concern around the world and inspected nuclear facilities in South Africa, Iraq, North Korea, Syria, Libya and elsewhere, seeking to ensure that nuclear materials were not diverted for military purposes. He led the Agency’s efforts to identify and dismantle nuclear proliferation networks, including the one led by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan, and he oversaw its efforts to monitor and contain Iran’s nuclear program.

To learn more about PSA’s Congressional Partnership Program, visit www.psaonline.org/cpp.

Dr. Olli Heinonen

Olli Heinonen is a Senior Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. His research and teachings include: nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, verification of treaty compliance, enhancement of the verification work of international organizations, and transfer and control of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Before joining the Belfer Center in September 2010, Olli Heinonen served 27 years at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. Heinonen was the Deputy Director General of the IAEA, and head of its Department of Safeguards. Prior to that, he was Director at the Agency’s various Operational Divisions, and, as inspector, including at the IAEA’s overseas office in Tokyo, Japan.

Heinonen led teams of international investigators to examine nuclear programmes of concern around the world and inspected nuclear facilities in South Africa, Iraq, North Korea, Syria, Libya and elsewhere, seeking to ensure that nuclear materials were not diverted for military purposes. He also spearheaded efforts to implement an analytical culture to guide and complement traditional verification activities. He led the Agency’s efforts to identify and dismantle nuclear proliferation networks, including the one led by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan, and he oversaw its efforts to monitor and contain Iran’s nuclear programme.

Prior to joining IAEA, he was a Senior Research Officer at the Technical Research Centre of Finland Reactor Laboratory in charge of research and development related to nuclear waste solidification and disposal. He is co-author of several patents on radioactive waste solidification.

Heinonen is the author of several articles, chapters of books, books, and publications ranging from the IAEA and nuclear non-proliferation issues, to regional nuclear developments. His writings and interviews have been published in various newspapers and magazines including: Foreign Policy, The Wall Street Journal, the Guardian, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Arms Control Today, Der Spiegel, Le Monde, the Helsingin Sanomat, the New York Times, the Mehr news, Die Stern, the Haaretz, the New Statesman, the Washington Post, the BBC, and the Time. His policy briefings have been published by the Belfer Center, the Atlantic Council, the Nautilus Institute, the Institute for Science and International Security, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and the Carnegie Endowment.

Olli Heinonen studied radiochemistry and completed his PhD dissertation in nuclear material analysis at the University of Helsinki.

At the Table: Perspectives on Iran Negotiations from Two Former U.S. Negotiators

FEB 7 – PUBLIC EVENT Nicholas Burns (Former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 2005-2008) and Robert Einhorn (Former State Department Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, 2009-2013)

EVENT COVERAGE FROM C-SPAN2 ARCHIVE

WHEN: February 7, 2014. 11:00am – Noon

WHERE: 2118 Rayburn House Office Building, Capitol Hill

Western countries have long suspected that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons while the Iranian government denies that accusation and insists on its right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. In November, the two sides reached an interim agreement under which Iran constrains its nuclear program in return for a modest easing of sanctions — a deal that began to take effect on January 20th.

Long-held mistrust between the U.S. and Iran, however, threatens to undermine the temporary arrangement and, possibly, a long-term agreement. What should the U.S. ask for in the final deal? What tack should western negotiators take to improve the likelihood of success? How can each side improve confidence in the other’s commitment to follow through? What is the role of the IAEA?

On February 7th, PSA held a bipartisan discussion with two former U.S. negotiators on Iran to gain valuable insights on these questions and what is in store for the future relationship between the U.S. and Iran, as well as its neighbors in the region.

Featuring

R. Nicholas Burns, Former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

Nicholas Burns has a distinguished career in government and the Foreign Service, including Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (2005 – 2008) and lead United States negotiator on Iran’s nuclear program. Based on his experiences in this position, Mr. Burns will be able to provide a first-hand account of formulating Iran policy and establishment of UN and U.S sanctions regimes. He is Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and Politics at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government.

Robert Einhorn, Former State Department Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, The Brookings Institution

Robert Einhorn is a senior fellow with the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative and the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, both housed within the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. Einhorn focuses on arms control (U.S.-Russia and multilateral), nonproliferation and regional security issues (including Iran, the greater Middle East, South Asia, and Northeast Asia), and U.S. nuclear weapons policies and programs.

CPP Alumni Dinner w/ IAEA Deputy Director General Janice Dunn Lee

DEC 4 – In recent years, leading nations have begun to focus efforts on the global nuclear governance agenda. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for assisting in the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and serving as the international watchdog monitoring nuclear programs to warn of any changes towards weapons development. As the P5+1 talks continue with Iran on the limitations of their nuclear pursuits and intentions, IAEA serves the purpose of tracking the country’s program. IAEA and Iran have engaged in constructive technical discussions that have led to a collaborative statement promising continued dialogue and the peaceful intentions of Iran’s nuclear programme. Dialogue between the two has made it possible for the IAEA to monitor and issue updates on Iran’s nuclear activities. A recent in-depth report by the IAEA indicated a lull in Iran’s nuclear installments starting in August at the time of President Hassan Rouhani’s innauguration.

Partnership for a Secure America held a private CPP alumni dinner with IAEA Deputy Director General Janice Dunn Lee to discuss the IAEA’s role in the current conversation, the future of the IAEA, and the how nuclear energy, security, and nonproliferation play a role in the global security landscape.

Janice Dunn Lee is the Deputy Director General, Head of the Department of Management at the International Atomic Energy Agency. She was appointed to the position on 1 January 2012.

Prior to this, Ms. Dunn Lee was the Deputy Director-General of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA) in Paris, France. Earlier, Ms. Dunn Lee was the Director of International Programs for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) where she managed international cooperative programmes in nuclear safety, technology, and materials, the import and export licensing of these materials and radioactive waste safety.

Ms. Dunn Lee joined the NRC in 1975 and held a number of progressively responsible positions. These included: Senior Assistant for international nuclear policy to four successive NRC Chairmen; Licensing Review and Policy Analyst in the Office of International Programs; and Chief for International Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards where she participated in programmes to assist countries to protect, control and account for nuclear materials. She was selected for the Senior Executive Service in 1998. She was appointed as the Deputy Director of the Office of International Programs in 1998 and as Director in 1999.

Ms. Dunn Lee participated in several special assignments and programmes while at the NRC. From 1989 to 1991, she served as a Congressional Fellow in the Office of Senator James A. McClure of Idaho. In 1993, she was on assignment to the Office of Senator Alan K. Simpson of Wyoming, where she served as a staff member on the Committee on Environment and Public Works. Ms Dunn Lee graduated from the NRC Supervisory Development Program in 1995 and the Federal Executive Institute in 1991.

Ms. Dunn Lee received a B.A. degree in Sociology from the University of California at Berkeley in 1973 and an M.A. degree in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, in 1975

Transparency = Security

Nuclear arms control is a critical pillar of America’s national security. Negotiated agreements to reduce the threat posed by the Cold War nuclear arms race have always enjoyed strong bipartisan support in the U.S.

In 1982, President Reagan proposed that the U.S. and the Soviet Union reduce their nuclear arsenals by thousands of warheads each. This proposal became the basis for the 1991 START I treaty. Since that time, every U.S. President, in concert with Russia, has advanced President Reagan’s legacy through steady and prudent reductions of the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals, including the 2002 Treaty of Moscow, signed by Presidents Bush and Putin.

On April 8, 2010, Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed the new START treaty, agreeing to further reduce both sides’ arsenals and bring into force a new regime for inspections and verification. This was a necessary and appropriate step toward safeguarding our national security. Without the new START, the U.S. has no legally binding ability to conduct inspections of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, and would be in a far weaker position to lead the world in stopping nuclear proliferation.

Now is the time for a thorough and balanced national discussion about nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. But we must remember that a world without a binding U.S.-Russian nuclear weapons agreement is a much more dangerous world. We, the undersigned Republicans and Democrats, support the new START treaty because we believe that it:

  • Enhances stability, transparency and predictability between the world’s two largest nuclear powers, which together possess about 95 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons
  • Contains verification and inspection measures essential to U.S. national security and nuclear threat reduction as it relates to Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons
  • Addresses our Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations and therefore assists in gaining cooperation from other countries on key nonproliferation priorities
  • Helps strengthen broader U.S.–Russia cooperation, which is important in responding to proliferation challenges from Iran and North Korea
  • Does not inhibit our ability to maintain an effective and reliable nuclear arsenal
  • Does not constrain our ability to develop and deploy missile defense systems

Signatories

Madeleine Albright Secretary of State 1997-2001
Howard Baker US Senator (R-TN) 1967-85
Samuel Berger National Security Advisor 1997-2001
Linton Brooks Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration 2002-07
Harold Brown Secretary of Defense 1977-81
Frank Carlucci Secretary of Defense 1987-89
Warren Christopher Secretary of State 1993-97
William Cohen Secretary of Defense 1997-2001
John C. Danforth US Senator (R-MO) 1977-95
Kenneth M. Duberstein White House Chief of Staff 1988-89
Chuck Hagel US Senator (R-NE) 1997-2009
Lee Hamilton US Congressman (D-IN) 1965-99; Co-Chair, PSA Advisory Board
Gary Hart US Senator (D-CO) 1975-87
Rita E. Hauser Chair, International Peace Institute
Carla Hills US Trade Representative 1989-93
Nancy Kassebaum-Baker US Senator (R-KS) 1978-97
Thomas Kean Governor (R-NJ) 1982-90; 9/11 Commission Chair
Richard Leone President, The Century Foundation
Donald McHenry US Ambassador to the UN 1979-81
Sam Nunn US Senator (D-GA) 1972-96
William Perry Secretary of Defense 1994-97
Thomas Pickering Under Secretary of State 1997-2000
Colin L. Powell Secretary of State 2001-05
Warren Rudman US Senator (R-NH) 1980-92; Co-Chair, PSA Advisory Board
Alan Simpson US Senator (R-WY) 1979-97
George Shultz Secretary of State 1982-89
Theodore Sorensen White House Special Counsel 1961-63
John Whitehead Deputy Secretary of State 1985-88
Timothy E. Wirth US Senator (D-CO) 1987-93
Frank Wisner Under Secretary of State 1992-93

 

 

This project is made possible by the generous support of Ploughshares Fund and The Connect U.S. Fund.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Security

Matthew Rojansky and Daniel Cassman
October 2009

This report, originally published as an article in YaleGlobal, examines the risk of Al Qaeda or the Taliban obtaining nuclear material in Pakistan. The report includes an analysis of which nuclear sites in Pakistan are most at risk, and a map of the sites and their geographic relation to territory controlled by the Taliban versus the Pakistani government.

 

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